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Our investigation deals with a new regulatory dimension of corporate responsibility, the 
disclosure of conflict minerals in the supply chain. This requirement suggests that corporate 
obligation now goes beyond their own operations and corporates are held accountable for 
their suppliers’ responsible/irresponsible actions. We investigate whether the 
comprehensiveness of conflict mineral disclosures are influenced by collaboration with social 
movement NGOs. We make a significant contribution to the literature by examining what 
influences the comprehensiveness of conflict mineral disclosures.  
 
We focus on 139 companies from the Forbes Global 2000. We find that the transparency of 
conflict mineral disclosures are significantly influenced by companies’ collaborations with 
social movement NGOs. Our findings suggest that NGO collaboration seems to be the answer 




1. Introduction  
Prior research has examined how market or shareholder expectations (Ness and Mirza, 1991; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2012), regulators (Frost, 2007), media (Deegan et al., 2002; Islam and 
Deegan, 2010), Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006), 
Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) (Islam and McPhail, 2011) influence different types 
corporate social and environmental disclosures. In this article we extend the prior research by 
looking at whether and how NGOs influence a specific type of corporate disclosures, i.e., 
supply chain-transparency disclosures in relation to the use of conflict minerals. In this paper 
we use joint consideration of social movement theory, legitimacy theory and theory of 
collaboration to explain the disclosures by focusing on a sample of companies from the 
Forbes Global 2000.   
Early research focused on the general nature of social and environmental reporting 
issues (see reviews by Mathews, 1997; Parker, 2005). The research agenda has changed over 
time and there is a growing body of research focusing on specific social or environmental 
issues and associated disclosures (see for example, Islam and McPhail, 2011; Haque and 
Deegan, 2010).  There are also calls for special journal issues focusing on specific types of 
social and environmental agendas, for example, some recent calls have drawn attention to 
climate change and accounting for bio-diversity (see for example special issues of 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal in 2013 and 2014 respectively) and human 
rights accounting and corruption (see for example special issues of Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting in 2011 and 2015 respectively). As stakeholder and regulatory expectations 
change over time, research attention also changes. Our study focusses conflict mineral 
disclosures for which expectations of non-state actors (this being NGOs) and regulatory 
expectations have gone hand in hand to a large extent to create corporate accountability and 
transparency in corporate supply chains.  
Our investigation deals with a new regulatory dimension of corporate responsibility 
which suggests corporate obligation now goes beyond their own operations and corporates 
are held accountable for their suppliers’ responsible/irresponsible actions.  It is the power of 
NGOs as social movement organizations which have influenced the US governments enact 
the “Dodd-Frank Act” (Section 1502) to regulate the disclosures of listed companies in 
relation to transparency in supply chains. In particular US SEC has adopted section 1502 of 
this act, which requires listed companies to file a conflict mineral report in order to provide 
annual accounts of conflict minerals if used by the companies. While it was the success of the 
NGOs along with other stakeholders to influence the government to introduce the “Dodd-
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Frank Act”, NGOs have been emerging to influence companies by way of monitoring the 
implementation of the act.  In this paper we are particularly interested to understand the 
influence of NGOs on corporate transparency disclosures in relation to the source of conflict 
minerals. The view taken in this paper is that while the law requires a minimum disclosure by 
the companies, NGOs will influence the comprehensiveness and hence the transparency of 
the disclosures.  
Across different industries, there is widespread stakeholder concern over human 
rights violations in the supply chains of MNCs operating overseas including conflict zones in 
Africa. Human rights violations in supply chains range from human trafficking to child, 
forced and slave labour and associated lack of transparency in the supply chains (Grootaert 
and Patrinos, 1999; Psacharopoulos, 1997; Kolk and Van Tulder, 2002; Haltsonen, Kourula 
and Salmi, 2007; World Bank, 2009; UN, 2008; Moodie, 2014;) have frequently earned 
broader community concern (see for example, Kolk and Van Tulder, 2002; Shelton and 
Wachter, 2005; UN Global Compact, 2011; Kettis, 2009; Verbruggen, Francq and Cuvelier, 
2011). Electronics reliant industries attract broader community attention as a large part of 
supply their chains operate in conflict mineral zones (Lezhnev and Hellmuth, 2012).  In 
particular, lack of transparency about the origin of many consumer products sold in the U.S. 
has fuelled opposition to economic globalization as well as questioned the present 
accountability practices (Mansfield and Mutz, 2013; Bregman et al., 2015). There is pressure 
from stakeholders for more transparent supply chains (Chen and Slotnick, 2015). There is 
evidence of NGOs creating greater pressure on companies to be transparent to the wider 
community (Reinecke and Ansari, 2015; New, 2010). In particular since 2009, numerous 
public-private collaborations including those of NGOs and industry-led initiatives have 
sought greater transparency in companies’ sourcing from conflict mineral zones (Reinecke 
and Ansari, 2015; Lezhnev and Hellmuth, 2012). In response to greater community concern, 
the US SEC has introduced the conflict mineral disclosure rule 1502. 
Since the enactment of the section 1502, debates over disclosure have ensued (Taylor, 
2014). At the heart of the arguments is the question of what information matters to investors 
and what mechanism is best suited to ensure that the right “mix” of information is provided at 
the least cost to the system (Taylor, 2014). However, this is a unique situation as this appears 
to be the first act in the US history that marks a major shift in the SEC's traditional role as a 
market regulator of financially material information or financial reporting that bears directly 
on a company's stock performance (Nelson, 2014). Despite criticism from industry 
representatives, section 1502 requires disclosure regardless of materiality to shareholders 
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(Nelson, 2014). The rise of socially responsible stakeholders (NGOs) has shifted the 
paradigm away from accounting and financial information, demanding more transparency on 
issues of human rights and social responsibility (Nelson, 2014) and from this perspective 
section 1502 is significant. This also gives researchers a platform to reinforce the application 
of socially driven theoretical framework in explaining corporate disclosures (see Deegan and 
Blomquist, 2006; Cho et al., 2015; Patten, 2007; Cannizzaro and Weiner, 2015) rather than 
conventional market based or shareholder driven theoretical models (e.g., Dhaliwal et al, 
2012).  
Our study is also motivated by the nature of the debate over the application of rule 
1502.  There is concern and attention by NGOs about the application of rule. There is also 
tension that many companies have failed to do the minimum required by the law (Amnesty 
International, 2015). Some situation and provision of the rule appear to create a different 
nature of voluntary environment.  The legal consequences of poor conflict minerals filings 
have yet to be tested. Similar to other filing requirements, the SEC can sanction companies 
that file false and misleading conflict minerals reports or fail to file a report when one is 
required. The SEC has the power to delist a company from the stock exchange, but this is 
used extremely rarely and only against repeat offenders (Amnesty International, 2015).  From 
this perspective, we do not know much about the consequence of failing to meet the section 
1502 requirements. The rule requires minimum mandatory disclosures in relation to conflict 
minerals. In relation to the extent/comprehensiveness of disclosures, the rule largely remains 
silent or debatable. Debate and uncertainty over the minimum mandatory disclosure 
requirement raises the question of the extent/level/comprehensiveness to which disclosures 
are produced. Therefore, under these circumstances, we expect variations of disclosures 
between companies.  
This paper focuses on 139 companies from the Forbes Global 2000. We find conflict 
mineral transparency disclosures are significantly influenced by companies’ collaborations 
with NGOs. Such finding suggests that relying on NGOs’ collaborations seem to be the 
answer for corporate transparency and accountability.  
The paper provides significant contribution by examining what drives conflict mineral 
disclosures. Within social science literature, prior research was dedicated to investigate social 
movement being non-market forces (Davis et al., 2008) or being collaborations as 
contributing factors to influence state policy, corporate policy and procedures. While prior 
research is important base for our work, this has not yet investigated the role of NGOs as 
social movement organisations on corporate transparency and disclosure practices. Within the 
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broader domain of accounting and disclosure literature, prior disclosure scholarship was 
dedicated to investigate whether stakeholder groups external to the organisations, including 
non-market stakeholders, have a role to influence particular disclosure practices. Among 
those looked at non-market players’ influence on particular disclosure practices, found that 
media, NGOs, IGOs or regulators have influence on disclosure practices. While prior 
research investigates a range of actors to influence disclosure practices, this has overlooked 
the role of NGOs (except being a case study by Deegan and Blomquist, 2006) influencing 
particular corporate disclosures. Our paper fills in the current research gap by investigating 
the influence of NGOs over the comprehensiveness and hence transparency of corporate 
disclosure practices in relation to conflict minerals. 
 
2. Corporate accountability in the supply chain in conflict zones 
The exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originated in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC).  The extreme violence and human rights violations in the DRC have resulted 
in a loss of more than 5.4 million lives since it was instigated in the late 1990’s (Global 
Witness, 2011). For years, rebels in the Congo have illegally mined minerals and sold them to 
multinational companies (MNCs) to fund their war efforts in the DRC (Global Witness, 
2011). It is mostly companies within the electronics reliant industries which the activists and 
NGOs accuse of fuelling or financing armed groups in the DRC and so activists have been 
campaigning to get companies to remove conflict minerals from their supply chains 
(Verbruggen, Francq and Cuvelier, 2011).  Given the human sufferings through the conflict, 
protesters observe that in producing countries, mineral-related legislation is rarely executed 
or enforced (BSR, 2010). Along with massive human rights violations, corruption, 
insufficient political will and a lack of capacity and infrastructure as well as power 
imbalances, (e.g., unequal negotiating capacities between communities, smaller producing 
nations and MNCs) and non-existent borders, make illicit minerals flow easy (Moodie, 2014; 
BSR, 2010). 
Generally, there is great concern over irresponsible supply chain practices across 
industries ranging from the clothing industry, mining industry to the electronics industry. The 
extra institutional pressures (such as boycotts or protests) often arise around MNCs’ sourcing 
from developing countries.  While this offshoring does not hurt US economy (Mandel, 2007), 
there is an enormous community pressures arising from supply chain relationships with the 
suppliers in many developing nations where there is frequent use of forced and child labour 
(UN, 2008) and where the structure to safeguard workers or local community is either absent 
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or not executed.  US companies frequently face mounting criticisms from stakeholder groups 
about the use of forced, child and slave labour via human trafficking by their suppliers in 
developing countries (AFLCIO, 2011; Haltsonen, Kourula and Salmi, 2007; Bachman, 2000; 
Spar, 1998; Wah, 1998; OneWorld US, 2006; ILRF, 2009; Share, 2011; UN Global Compact, 
2011; Dominin, 2008). As slavery in the form of child and forced labour is a problem that 
touches impoverished people overseas (Keehn, 2012), there is a growing number of US 
NGOs including, but not limited to, Fair Labour Association (FLA), Workers rights 
consortium (WRC), Interfaith Worker Justice (IWJ),United Students Against Sweatshops 
(USAS), Maine CleanClothes Campaign, The American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) , CorpWatch Campaign for Labor Rights (CLR), 
Amnesty International, The RAISE Hope, Conflict- Free Sourcing Initiatives, whose aims are 
to highlight concerns and to improve working conditions and community livelihood  in the 
global supply chains which produce goods for US markets (Hughes, Buttle and Wrigley, 
2007; Carpenter, 2012; Amnesty International, 2015).1  
Within electronics reliant industries, there is even greater stakeholder concern over 
the use of inhuman sourcing or conflict minerals based in the DRC in particular. The United 
States Geological Survey indicates that the DRC is the world conflict mineral supplier with 
greatest percentages of 3T (tin, tantalum, tungsten) elements (United States Geological 
Survey (USGS), 2010). The four main conflict minerals are being mined in the Congo (the 
3Ts and gold) and most of these minerals eventually present or wind up in electronic devices 
of the electronics based industries (United States Geological Survey (USGS), 2010). Many 
electronics related companies are suspected to have been incorporating those elements 
directly and/or indirectly through their complex supply chains and it is a challenge for 
regulatory bodies and auditors to identify and control (Matthews, 2013). In the US, a massive 
social movement via NGOs and rights organisations enhances the recognition of the Dodd-
Frank Act (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Section 1502). The 
provision on conflict minerals contained in the Section 1502 of the act obliges companies that 
trade on US stock exchanges and are implicated in the supply chains of tin, tantalum, 
tungsten and gold, to apply due diligence (Section 1502). 
 
                                                          
1 See at www.workersrights.org/; www.iwj.org; www.usas.org/; www.pica.ws/programs/CleanClothes/; 
www.globallabourrights.org/; www.corpwatch.org; www.clrlabor.org; www.aflcio.org/). 
6 
 
3. NGOs and the transparency of disclosure in terms of the regulations (“Dodd-Frank 
Act”) 
There are various NGOs dedicated either entirely to the DRC or devote significant part of 
their work to end the use of conflict minerals. As discussed in the previous section, there is 
widespread stakeholder concern, including from NGOs’, over irresponsible supply chain 
practices by many US companies.  In relation to conflict minerals, such NGOs, for example, 
includes Falling Whistles, Global Witness, Raise Hope for Congo, Free2Work, and Conflict 
Free Sourcing Initiatives (CFSI).   
While one group of NGOs campaign against irresponsible corporate behaviour, 
another group of organizations collaborate with companies to help eliminate irresponsible 
behaviour. For example, the Raise Hope for Congo independently campaign against 
companies in order to end the use of conflict minerals. As a subdivision of the Enough 
project, which aims to stop and prevent genocide, Raise Hope for Congo works with both 
Congolese and international organizations, like Amnesty International. The campaign mainly 
focuses on violence towards women and children in the conflict (Carpenter, 2012).  It aims to 
“protect and empower” them through the help of grassroots establishments and international 
organizations. It also seeks to increase the prominence of the conflict in the media, offering 
individuals information and a number of possibilities to get involved.2 Knowledge of the 
conflict is on the rise in the public eye, causing pressure on policy makers and companies 
involved (Carpenter, 2012). On the other hand, an example of NGOs that collaborate with 
companies is Conflict free Sourcing Initiatives (CFSI). CFSI is a multi-stakeholder initiative 
that collaborate with companies as monitor or inspector in an attempt to bring about change 
by helping companies to ensure transparency in the conflict mineral supply chains and to 
enable the sourcing of conflict free minerals.3 The collaboration effort will also help to see 
whether and how concern companies implement existing norms and laws (such as the Dodd-
Frank Act) in relation to conflict minerals.  
Over the last decade, due to massive social movement by NGOs, the UN chose panels 
of experts to investigate the exploitation of resources in the DRC (Leader, 2008), while the 
EU appointed representatives to review the trade of conflict minerals (Reese, 2010). But the 
most visible initiative is the US Dodd-Frank Act. Due to NGO movements influencing senate 
members, the US senate passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act of 
2010. In fact, Dodd-Frank act is one of the most visible initiatives coming out of campaigns 
                                                          
2 See http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/about/about-the-campaign. 
3 See (ttp://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/about. 
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by NGOs and political leaders. On 16 July 2010, the “Dodd-Frank Act” has passed the 
Congress. On 22 August 2012, the SEC has adopted Section 1502 of this new law imposed. 
Section 1502 requires companies to file certain reports with the SEC to provide annual 
disclosure as to the source of certain materials designated as “conflict materials” in their 
products by 31 May 2014, covering products manufactured starting 1 January 2013.  The rule 
requires disclosures every 31 May thereafter, and will cover products manufactured in the 
prior calendar year.  
The purpose of the new rules (the Section 1502) is to further the humanitarian goal of 
ending violent conflict in the DRC and the adjoining region, which includes Angola, Burundi, 
Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia (Covered Countries).4 The rule possess disclosure requirements to 
promote the exercise of due diligence on the source of conflict minerals5 in supply chains, 
and to persuade companies to procure conflict minerals from sources that do not finance or 
being beneficial to armed groups in the Covered Countries. The aim of the rule is not to ban 
the use of conflict minerals, but create greater transparency and responsible sourcing among 
companies. 
More specifically, under Section 1502, companies are required to determine if any of 
their manufactured products contain conflict minerals. Companies must perform a reasonable 
country of origin inquiry to determine whether conflict minerals originated in the DRC 
countries or its neighbouring countries (OECD, 2011; Bowman, 2013; Ernst and Young, 
2012).4 Companies must disclose a description of the measures taken to exercise due 
diligence on the source and chain of supply – this would include a description of the due 
diligence including whether they used any recognized standards or guidance; the facilities 
used to process the conflict minerals and the efforts to determine the mine or location of the 
origin (SEC, 2012). If the conflict minerals do not originate from the DRC regions, the 
company is only required to file a form called Form SD, but not the conflict minerals report. 
However, if the conflict minerals originate from the DRC regions, the company will be 
required to file a conflict minerals report including an independent private sector audit (Ernst 
and Young, 2012). In the event that the origin is unclear, companies are allowed to classify 
the mineral as “undeterminable” and describe the due diligence to determine the origin of the 
minerals. However, there is no legislation governing the classification of “undeterminable” 
                                                          
4 See http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171562058 
5 The conflict minerals currently include gold, tin, tantalum and tungsten, the derivatives of cassiterite, columbite-tantalite 
and wolframite, known as the “3TG”. Conflict mineral include all 3TG minerals regardless whether they are originated in 
the Covered Countries.  
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(Ernst and Young, 2012). Therefore, if conflict minerals originated from DRC countries or 
the issuer is unable to determine if minerals are DRC-conflict free, they may be considered 
“DRC conflict undeterminable” but this will only be allowed for a two year period for large 
companies and a four year period for small companies and still requires a conflict minerals 
report. However, there is no requirement for a conflict minerals report audit for the products 
that are DRC Conflict undeterminable (SEC, 2012). If a company files an inaccurate conflict 
minerals report, it could face financial penalties under the Securities Exchange Act (SEC, 
2012). And, an insufficient audit of that report could also open companies to liability (SEC, 
2012). 
According to the SEC rule (section 1502), the due diligence process requires companies 
to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their adverse human rights 
impacts.  According to the UN’s ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, ‘the process should include assessing actual and potential human rights 
impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating 
how impacts are addressed.’ (Ruggie, 2011). In contexts where there is a risk of contributing 
to conflict, risk-based due diligence is necessary to address potential or actual risks, and to 
mitigate the adverse impacts of activity or sourcing (OECD, 2011). The SEC has instructed 
companies to use a nationally or internationally recognized due diligence framework, such as 
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) (Hochfelder, 2014). Due diligence is very important because it is 
“an on-going, proactive and reactive process through which companies can ensure that they 
respect human rights and do not contribute to conflict” (OECD, 2013). The structure of 
OECD’s due diligence in the supply chain system is as follows OECD (2013): 
1. Establish strong company management systems. 
2. Identify and assess risk in the supply chain 
3. Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks 
4. Carry out independent third-party audit of supply chain due diligence at identified 
points in the supply chain 
5. Report on supply chain due diligence 
The SEC’s suggestion to use the due diligence process is a qualitative and voluntary 
guideline and there will therefore be variations between companies expected to adopt a due 
diligence process. Under the rule, the SEC allows performance audits over financial audits 
and attestation reports, but the performance audits don’t have a standard form, language, and 
9 
 
is not meant to offer companies a clear black and white conclusion. It is more likely to be 
more of a free-flowing narrative that offers an array of opinions and recommendations.  
 
4. Contribution to the accounting and disclosure research literature 
Prior accounting literature that looked at supply chains mainly investigated management 
accounting practices within the supply chain (Frances and Garnsey, 1996; Langfield-Smith 
and Smith, 2003; Seal, Berry and Cullen, 2004; Seal et al, 1999; Free, 2008; Bhimani and 
Ncube, 2006; Gossman and Kohlbeck, 2009; Neu, Rahaman and Everett, 2014). Prior 
management accounting research in particular focussed on trust and buyer-supplier 
relationship while pursuing economic gains (see for example, Free, 2008), cost-benefit 
analysis of external supply alliances (see for example, Bhimani and Ncube, 2006), 
coordination and control in low-price production chains (see for example, Neu, Rahaman and 
Everett, 2014) and how buyer power in the retail market affects suppliers’ profitability (see 
for example, Gossman and Kohlbeck, 2009). Both financial accounting and the voluntary 
disclosure literature has paid very little attention to the supply chain. There is widespread 
global attention towards the disclosures, transparency and accountability in supply chains and 
some stakeholders have put pressure upon companies to be visible and transparent on the 
working conditions, including human trafficking, in their supply chains. Despite this, 
research investigating how and whether companies disclose transparency measures in the 
supply chains is scant.   
Research investigating whether and how external actors to the organisations influence 
organisational social and environmental disclosure practices is growing (Patten, 2002; 
Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Cooper and Owen, 2007; Islam and Deegan, 2008, 2010; 
Deegan and Islam, 2014). However, there is a lack of research (but see Deegan and 
Blomquist, 2006) that investigates whether NGOs influence corporate disclosure practices. 
Within the sociology literature, the role of NGOs and social movement organisations in 
influencing organisational operating practices (including organisational policy, procedures 
and even actions) is well researched (see for example, Davis et al., 2008). While the NGO 
movement is studied in sociology literature, disclosure is not considered as an issue of the 
research.  
Prior research within accounting and disclosure looked at the role of NGOs using 
interviews to understand their influence on corporate social and environmental performance 
and associated disclosure practices (see for example, Deegan and Blomquist, 2006). Deegan 
and Blomquist showed how the WWF Australia was able to influence the reporting 
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requirements incorporated within the Australian mineral industry’s environmental 
performance code. The study also showed that senior executives of the minerals industry 
responded to the WWF’s sanctioning of the code to maintain legitimacy. A relatively more 
recent interview based study (see Deegan and Islam, 2014) find that NGOs have a role to 
create corporate accountability and disclosure practices. Deegan and Islam (2014) show that 
NGOs use the media to create accountability practices in a developing nation connected with 
international trade. Those prior studies in accounting investigated the role of NGOs to 
influence particular corporate disclosures; a few of them focused on NGOs and their 
collaborations with industry (see for example, Deegan and Blomquist, 2006). In fact there is 
not much research in accounting to explain NGOs’ role in influencing corporate disclosures 
(see only Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Deegan and Islam, 2014 and Tilt, 1994). Prior 
research that talked about NGOs’ role only covered case studies and did not attempt to 
generalise the influence of NGOs over particular corporate disclosures. Therefore, there is a 
complete lack of hypothesis driven empirical study (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006 
acknowledge this) that explores the influence of NGOs over corporate disclosures. 
Furthermore, our focus is quite different from prior research [for example, Deegan and 
Blomquist (2006) explored WWW’s lobby capacity to influence  and Deegan and Islam 
explores NGOs’ use of news media to explain the disclosure practices] from five different 
angles: first we see collaborative NGOs as an agent of social movement organisations’ 
influence on disclosure practices. Second, while prior research sees the issue of environment 
and working condition as central to the analysis of NGOs’ roles, we are interested to see role 
of NGOs in influencing disclosures and transparency in relation to human rights and the 
elimination of conflict minerals within the supply. Third, NGOs’ role in one industry is 
different from their roles in other industries. While prior research looked at the roles of NGOs 
influencing companies’ disclosures within the mineral industry (Deegan and Blomquist, 
2006), and within the clothing and retail industry (Deegan and Islam, 2014), we aim to look 
at companies’ disclosure practices within the electronics reliant industries. Fourth, no-one so 
far looked at NGOs that collaborate with companies in order to create transparency and 
accountability and associated disclosure practices in relation to supply chains. Fifth, the 
notion of influence by NGOs is different from the notion of influence explained in any other 
study before: we find two levels of influence.  At the first level, NGOs influenced the 
regulatory agency (US SEC) to incorporate minimum disclosure requirements/regulations 
(for instance Section 1502 of Dodd Frank Act) which in turn influenced corporate disclosure 
behaviour.  At the first level NGOs (via protest, campaign or/and social movement) had huge 
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success to get regulators to put particular regulations in place. At the second level (which is 
in the post regulation enactment period), after enactment of the regulation by regulators (say 
the SEC), the NGOs’ roles change. Many NGOs started collaborations with companies either 
to monitor or to implement the regulator’s disclosure requirements. Our focus is the second 
level roles of NGOs as we expect variation in the comprehensiveness and transparency of 
corporate disclosures depending on the level of NGO collaboration.  
 
5. NGOs as social movement actors and the corporate response: a theoretical 
framework and hypotheses 
We use social movement theory, legitimacy theory and the theory of collaboration to explore 
factors that influence corporate transparency disclosures in relation to conflict minerals. The 
theoretical framework in particular lead to a hypothesis in relation to how institutional forces 
such as NGOs (through their collaboration) influence the transparency of conflict mineral 
disclosures by global electronic reliant companies listed on US stock exchanges. Literature 
on social movement theory has been used by sociologists to understand organisational 
behaviour. Based on review, Davis et al. (2008) argue that social movement theory has only 
recently spread into mainstream organisational studies. The theory can not only go beyond 
conventional explanations to reveal new insights, but can also open up new areas of inquiry 
(Davis et al., 2008). While earlier research by social movement scholars has focused almost 
exclusively on outcomes in the political domain, Davis et al. (2008) have emphasized the 
importance of looking at additional types of movement outcomes by giving attention to 
movements that target companies and other business organizations. Given the central role 
that business organizations play in contemporary society, it is curious that both social 
movement scholars and accounting scholars have not yet considered supply chain 
transparency disclosure as a focus of their research.  
In the literature, the idea of social movement is found in the early work by Davies 
(1962), Gurr (1970), Toch (1965), Oberschall (1973), Tilly (1978) and Jenkins, (1983). Early 
social movement literature concentrated on causes (for example, Davies, 1962) and 
motivations (see for example, Toch, 1965) behind the social movements.  Things have 
changed over the last two decades and social movements are now used as a cause for 
organisational change (see Davis et al., 2008; Soule, 2012).  Social movements are 
traditionally seen as extensions of basic forms of shared behaviour surrounding the 
movement of personal change (religious sects, cults and communes) and movement of 
institutional change (legal reforms and changes in political power) (Jenkins, 1983). The 
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biggest action of social movements has been the investigation of the modernisation of 
collective actions by Tilly (1978). Based on Tilly (1978), social movement theory comes 
from a central idea that social movement organisations, including NGOs, develop from their 
responsive actions to long term pre-emptive actions for the purpose of social development or 
to create a change to a way of life. The theory posits that social movement organisations can 
impact policy decisions at the state, local and national (Soule et al., 1999; Soule and King, 
2006) and international levels. Social movements thus target existing systems of authority, 
such as the state, educational institutions and of course companies (King and Soule, 2007). 
Davis et al., (2008) argue that social movement research should be extended from the 
investigation of movements that are state centred to movements that are corporate-centred, 
but at the same time they believe that the research must explicitly take into account various 
kinds of institutional and extra-institutional power (protest, boycott or even collaboration) 
that play important roles in constraining and facilitating social movements in organisations 
and markets. The theory highlights the strength of supportive social movement organisations 
through their capacity to mobilise forces such as protest, lobbying or even collaboration are 
able to influence policymakers (Soule and King, 2006) as well as the actors of the 
organisation on which policy is imposed. According to Davis et al. (2008) ‘social movements 
are often represented by formal organisations, while organizations resemble episodic 
‘movements’ rather than bounded actors’ (p.389). 
Social movement theory suggests that movements with a greater organisational 
capacity will be more effective than those lacking a strong organisational infrastructure 
(Soule and King, 2006). To discuss the regulatory influence of social movements, Soule and 
King (2006) argue that earlier phases of the legislative process have less tough requirements 
for the success in the sense that introducing a bill requires the support of only one legislator, 
while passing a bill requires a majority of votes. Soule and King, (2006) argue that the role 
social movement organisation is crucial at the early stage and in fact it is easier for movement 
organisations to demonstrate legislative support for their issue early on, before proposed 
policies come to the vote. As such the extent that movement organisations matter to 
regulation, they matter at the earlier stages of the regulatory process. This is equally 
applicable to the policy and legislation process of Dodd-Frank Act. 
In her study, Soule (2009) provides some interesting cases of the implications of 
social movement organisations. She described US activist attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to 
reinforce state regulation in the tuna fishing industry in an effort to decrease the number of 
dolphin deaths associated with the use of purse-seine nets.  In her recent work, Soule (2012) 
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argues that there have been a rise of private regulatory agencies (including NGOs) that certify 
corporate conducts such as supply chains. She explained, for example, the Forest 
Stewardship Council, the Marine Stewardship Council and Social Accountability 
International have all formed in recent years as private regulatory agencies which are mostly 
NGOs designed to monitor and certify products and supply chains. Another example of this is 
The Workers’ Rights Consortium as a private regulator which was formed as an alternative to 
the Industry sponsored Fair Labour Association (Soule, 2009).   
As companies shift their operations and/or sourcing materials overseas, NGOs’ roles 
as social movement organisations cross the national boundary. Davis et al. (2008) argued in 
an increasingly global economy, that social movements are growing more transnational. 
NGOs, through their activities and changed strategies, create concern over human rights’ 
violations at companies’ foreign operations. In response to this, more and more companies 
are also changing their behaviour, this notion is ingrained in the social movement theory. 
Within the global business environment, Davis et al. (2008) argue social movements are 
prevalent in and around organisations, from monitoring the activities of MNCs to progressing 
demands for human rights to encouraging or thwarting the development of new technologies 
to demanding that companies confess to negligence. Davis et al (2008) highlight one 
example, the boycott of Nestle in the late 1970s aimed at halting its sales of infant formula in 
developing countries. This has been followed by series of consumer actions aimed at 
changing the behaviour of MNCs. Davis et al (2008) gives more examples, which is tied up 
with supply operation overseas.  In the mid-2000s, Wal-Mart had been held responsible for 
the labour practices of suppliers and Shell was held accountable for human rights practices of 
regimes in the nations where they operate. Davis et al (2008) argue that social movements 
approach to changing corporate behaviour range from sabotage to collaboration. They went 
on saying that some organisations learn to tolerate and even work or collaborate with social 
movements that initially appeared to threaten their interests. They believe that the study of 
social movements and organizations in transnational contexts provides an interesting avenue 
for future research. They suggest that important engagements between organisations and 
social movements are occurring in transnational contexts around the issues of global 
economic development, environmental protection and sustainability and even the dark side of 
transnational dynamics such as terrorism and struggles for social justice and equity.  
The second theory this article uses is legitimacy theory which has been widely used 
theory to explain corporate social and environmental disclosures. Legitimacy theory posits 
that as the value systems of organisations are congruent with the value systems of the 
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community in which organisations operate, organisations become responsive to the 
community expectations. Prior research using legitimacy theory explains different 
motivations for social and environmental disclosures. As some of the motivations highlighted 
by Deegan (2002, pp. 290-91): 
 The desire to comply with legal requirements. This would not be a major motivation 
in a great deal of countries given the lack of requirements in relation to social and 
environmental disclosures and associated verifications (Deegan, 2000). 
 To comply with community expectations, perhaps reflective of a view that 
compliance with the “community licence to operate” (or “social contract”) is 
dependent upon providing certain accounts of social and environmental performance 
(Deegan, 2002). 
 As a result of certain threats to the organisation’s legitimacy. For example, reporting 
might be a response to negative media attention, particular environmental or social 
incidents, or perhaps as a result of poor rating being given by particular ratings 
agencies (see Deegan et al., 2000, 2002; Patten, 1992). 
 To comply with industry requirements, or particular codes of conduct. For example, 
within Australia the Australian Minerals Industry has a Code for Environmental 
Management (as do other industries, such as the Australian Electricity Industry). 
There are certain pressures to sign to such codes. Such codes can then have associated 
reporting requirements (see Deegan and Blomquist, 2001). 
Deegan’s (2002) review was followed by Islam and Deegan (2008) that extended legitimacy 
theory by looking at the expectations of the global community as well as the influence of 
MNCs over social disclosure practices by a major organisation in a developing nation. The 
more recent study (see for example, Deegan and Islam, 2014) contributed to the legitimacy 
literature by investigating the NGOs’ use of media to influence corporate disclosure 
behaviour within the global supply chains. In this paper we investigate whether companies 
respond to the expectations of collaborative NGOs in order to maintain their legitimacy.  
The third and final theory this article uses is the theory of collaboration. According to 
Wood and Gray (1991)  “collaboration occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of a 
problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms and structures, to 
act or decide on issues related to that domain” (p. 146). The key elements of the concept of 
collaboration deserves explanation. In the collaboration process, multiple stakeholders agree 
on what the problem is, and that the problem is important enough to work with others to find 
a solution (Gray, 1996). Stakeholders retain their independent decision making powers in 
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achieving shared values/rules within the collaborative alliance. However, participating 
stakeholders must explicitly agree on the shared values or rules or structures that will govern 
their interactive process (Wood and Gray, 1991; Gray, 1996).  In the final stage of 
collaboration process, collaborators expect to see the implementation of the chosen course of 
action, requiring support and structure, including monitoring/auditing for compliance (Gray, 
1996). With respect to structure, collaborations are usually seen as temporary and evolving 
structures. However, such structure allows collaborators (stakeholders) to monitor or audit 
implementation of chosen action. If we look at the nature of NGOs and their structures, it is 
actually an evolving structure and their collaborations with companies appear to influence the 
transparency and the openness of the organizational actions.  Simply, collaboration is said to 
exist merely if/as long as the stakeholders engage in a process intended to result in action or 
decision (Wood and Gray, 1991).   
There are several outcomes of collaboration suggested in the social science literature 
(Wood and Gray, 1991): collaboration as an intention for change (Roberts and Bradly, 1991); 
as vehicles for social change (Pasquero, 1991) or a systematic capacity to respond to the 
environment (Selsky, 1991). These outcomes are mostly derived from stakeholder 
(stakeholders being collaborators) and community perspectives (or legitimacy perspectives).  
One of the common outcomes suggested is collaboration as a vehicle for social change - the 
outcomes which are expected by NGOs. However, it is interesting to know why a company 
responds to the expectations of its collaborators. One of the important motivations for a 
company to respond to collaborators is a desire to maintain and enhance legitimacy - the 
notion is consistent with legitimacy theory.    
Companies may legitimize their operations by following the guidance of a 
collaborative alliance. Companies respond to collaborator’s wishes as way of retaining their 
own legitimacy and lends legitimacy to stakeholder efforts in an organizational problem 
domain (Wood and Gray, 1991). The central attribute of the organization is fairness, because 
participants must be able to trust the organization’s power will not be used one-sidedly 
(Wood and Gray, 1991). The disclosure and related transparency becomes an integral part to 
maintain the relationship with collaborators and thus retain legitimacy. When legitimacy is 
the primary resource sought or at risk, collaboration or responding to collaborators may be a 
way of responding to institutional pressures for conformity (Wood and Gray, 1991; 
Sharfman, Gray and Yan, 1991). More recent sociology literature suggests collaboration is 
seen as yielding outcomes that bolster or enhance organizations’ legitimacy in the eyes of 
stakeholders (Butler and Tregaskis, 2015). An important issue for legitimacy building in 
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collaboration contexts is the need for greater impartiality to enable the interests of both 
organizations (capital) and collaborators (labour, community) to be taken into account (Butler 
and Tregaskis, 2015). Legitimacy may be viewed as an integral component of the 
institutional ‘glue’ that cements collaborations (Butler and Tregaskis, 2015).  
Companies’ collaboration with stakeholders therefore have legitimacy effects. It is 
our expectations that companies respond to the participation of NGOs in their transparency 
process in order to maintain their legitimacy. Prior social movement literature suggests that 
social movement organizations (in our study NGOs being social movement organisations) not 
only collaborate with protest groups in order to strengthen their movement (Wang and Soule, 
2012) but also collaborate with companies to see the impact of the trajectory of the social 
movement (Soule, 2012) and enhance transparency and legitimacy. Soule, (2012) has 
provided an interesting example that Coca Cola has been criticized very heavily for its use of 
water in developing nations, most especially in India. In recent years, Coca Cola has sought 
advice from several NGOs, including the World Wildlife Federation, and has entered into 
partnerships and collaborations in an effort to respond to criticisms by changing its practices. 
Our expectation is also derived from social movements or NGO literature that suggests that 
companies’ collaborations with NGOs can help them overcome these challenges because 
collaborations can help companies and stakeholders make sense of each other, channel 
institutional knowledge to the companies, and use their standing in civil society to confer 
social legitimacy to companies (Oetzel and Doh, 2009). Collaboration with NGOs appears 
important if companies seeks to maintain legitimacy in complex and diverse institutional 
environments (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Similarly we argue, NGOs, in a particular context 
(perhaps in the context of conflict minerals) is a vital actor whose collaboration with 
concerned companies provide a greater level of legitimacy in the global setting. The essence 
of existing collaboration theory and research presents some idea, but no firm conclusion, as to 
whether legitimation is the motivation for companies to collaborate on corporate transparency 
with stakeholders. The fundamental issue is to enhance legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders 
who represent the broader community. And hence social movement organizations such as 
NGOs can become collaborating stakeholders that aim to bring change in the society and 
represent the broader community expectations.  
In a summary, while social movement theory suggests NGOs can be agents of change 
in organisational fields by offering new solutions to collective problems (King and Soule, 
2007; Greenwood, Sudaby and Hinings, 2002); can create change in the world of companies 
and business via use of a tactical repertoire designed to complement their status as outsiders 
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to those companies (Soule et al., 1999) or present themselves as alternative democratic voices 
(King and Soule, 2007), the concept of collaboration suggests companies or organisations 
engage in collaboration with social movement organisations to solve their problems, create 
change, enhance transparency and maintain legitimacy.   
Considering the context of the global supply chains, there are several human rights 
problems (Child labour, human trafficking, slave and forced labour and so on) to be resolved 
(through collaborations) in general. Historically NGOs have a significant role in creating 
change within the global supply chains. For example, within the clothing industry, NGO 
social movements in the USA led by the Asian American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) have 
shaken the whole industry and global actors through their anti-child labour campaign and 
protest.  As a result within the supply chain of the electronic industry, NGOs have had a 
wider role to create a new environment where the Dodd-Frank act has been enacted to 
influence the transparency of disclosures in relation to conflict minerals. Keeping the 
discussion of conflict minerals in the supply chain within global companies in mind, we 
expect to see the influence of NGOs on corporate transparency disclosures in relation to 
conflict minerals. Based on the above discussion of social movement theory, legitimacy 
theory and the concept of collaboration, we propose the following hypothesis:   
H1: The transparency/comprehensiveness of disclosures on conflict minerals are 
influenced by corporate collaboration with NGOs.  
 
While our first hypothesis focus on the influence of NGO collaboration on the 
comprehensiveness (transparency) of conflict mineral disclosures, we need to take into 
account other influences on the quality (and extent) of disclosures. One main influence from 
the CSR literature, is the effect of social performance on CSR disclosure (see for example, 
Patten, 2002; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; and Silvia-Gao, 2012 on 
environmental performance vs. disclosure). These papers use a legitimacy informed 
expectation of a negative association between performance and disclosure and a voluntary 
disclosure informed expectation of a positive expectation between performance and 
disclosure. Both these associations are found and what we can learn from the literature is that 
environmental performance influence CSR disclosure, but it is unclear what the sign (positive 
of negative) is, i.e., does ‘good’ performance influence disclosure or does ‘bad’ performance 
influence disclosure? For example, Silva-Gao (2012) examined the predisposition among 54 
US electric utilities to disclose the amount of environmental capital expenditure (ECE) in the 
18 
 
Form 10-Ks. She found that firms with better environmental performance were more likely to 
report on ECE.  
We use legitimacy theory informed expectations that good companies (or good social 
and environmental performers) will want to inform stakeholders of this situation through 
good disclosures because they want this known as part of reputation building efforts and to 
distinguish themselves from bad performers. While there is not much research in the 
literature focussing on social disclosures, we propose that social performance will influence 
social disclosure, similar to the environmental disclosure studies in the literature. From this 
perspective, we hypothesise that corporate social performance will influence corporate social 
disclosures in relation to the elimination of conflict minerals.  
H2: The transparency/comprehensiveness of disclosures on conflict minerals are 
influenced by the corporate social performance of the companies.  
 
Companies that collaborate with social movement organisations may also perform better in 
future in the CSR area. For example a company, through collaboration may enhance social 
performance, legitimacy, funding and access to public policy decision makers in comparison 
to companies that do not have collaborations (Wood and Gray, 1991). The existence 
(presence or absence) of collaborations can clearly have an impact on subsequent interactions 
among the stakeholders or different groups of social movement organizations (Wood and 
Gray,1991). We formulate the following hypothesis: 
H3: Companies with collaborations with social movement organisations will have 
better CSR performance in the future. 
 
6. Research methods 
This study focuses on companies forming part of the Forbes’ 2014 Global 2000 companies 
(http://www.forbes.com/global2000/) that are involved in electronics reliant industries.6 We 
identified 475 companies as electronic reliant companies and out of them 139 companies 
were listed on US stock exchanges and submitted conflict mineral reports to SEC. Of these, 
95 companies are based in the USA and the rest of the companies are based in European and 
developing countries (including China).  Reporting on conflict minerals were reviewed to 
                                                          
6 The Forbes Global 2000 consists of the world’s biggest public companies. Forbes compile their Global 2000 list using data 
from FactSet Research systems to screen for the biggest public companies using four metrics: sales, profits, assets and 
market value. Each of the 2000 lists has a minimum cut-off value in order for a company to qualify: sales $4.16 billion, 
profits of $267.0 million, assets of $8.57 billion and market value of $5.49 billion. A company needs to qualify for at least 
one of the lists in order to be eligible for the final Global 2000 ranking. 
19 
 
document the transparency of the disclosures. The reports were collected from the SEC 
website.7 
 
Conflict mineral transparency disclosures  
We developed a disclosure index to document the quality of the disclosures. Nine specific 
disclosure items were considered and a scale was applied to develop the index. There is a 
variation of weights between the items given the nature, quality and extend of the issue (see 
also Blacconiere and Patten, 1994; Hooks and Van Staden, 2011).  In our disclosure index, 
we combined methods of content analysis (i.e., extent of discloses as well as quality of 
disclosures) in order to document the level of comprehensiveness and quality of disclosures. 
Our approach is broadly an extension of prior research by using different scales and by 
looking at completely new disclosure issues. Beattie’s (2014) review confirm that recent 
studies, without finding a stable conclusion, have used scale based disclosure indices. The 
details of the coding guide is provided in Table 1 (examples of actual disclosure and how 
they were coded is available from the authors). As shown in the Table 1, the maximum score 
a company could obtain is 20.   
In developing the different elements of disclosure for our index, we considered the 
disclosure requirements within the Dodd-Frank Act and the OECD’s due diligence guidance 
addressing conflict minerals (basic guidance was discussed in the prior section). While prior 
disclosure research was also used to list the nature of the disclosure items in the disclosure 
list, our disclosure items are new in nature in so far as there is no known research that looked 
at these items to understand the motivation for the adoption of such items by companies. An 
expert content analyst reviewed the reports and completed the coding.  
<< Insert Table 1>> 
We base our content analysis on the first reports filed with the SEC as at 31 May 2014 
(covering product manufactured from 1 January 2013). Our disclosure score is out of 100, 
based on the actual score obtained over the maximum possible score. 
 
Collaboration with NGOs (social movement organisations)  
Social movement organizations are expected to influence conflict mineral disclosure 
practices. Following the Dodd-Frank act, social movement organizations have kept focusing 
                                                          




on the monitoring activities and how the act’s provisions have been executed. Social 
movement organisations are seen to collaborate with companies to monitor or assist 
companies. Such collaboration appears to influence conflict mineral disclosures because one 
of the aims of such collaboration is to create transparency. The data on collaborations with 
social movement organisations have been collected from the company reports, websites and 
conflict mineral reports. We identified the number of collaborations a company had during 
the year before 31 May 2014, up to a maximum of three.  We find that the main purpose of 
collaboration with social movement organizations is involvement in monitoring and auditing 
activities to identify and eliminate conflict minerals and ensure transparency within the 
supply chains. For example, social movement organisations such as CFSI (Conflict- Free 
Sourcing Initiatives), founded in 2008, have grown into one of the most utilized and 
respected resources for companies from a range of industries addressing conflict mineral 
issues in their supply chains. Over 200 companies participate in the CFSI, contributing to a 
range of tools and resources including the ‘Conflict-Free Smelter Program’, the ‘Conflict 
Minerals Reporting Template’, ‘Reasonable Country of Origin Inquiry data’ and a range of 
guidance documents on conflict minerals sourcing. The CFSI also runs regular workshops on 
conflict mineral issues and contributes to policy development and debates with leading civil 
society organizations and governments.8 The CFSI provides a variety of tools and resources 
to support companies to make informed decisions about conflict minerals in their supply 
chains and to report on these. The CFSI engages with a variety of non-governmental 
organizations, responsible investor groups, governments and multilateral institutions to 
discuss emerging issues, best practices and work on addressing shared challenges.  It has 
close collaboration with Brussels based body, Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) and 
Electronic Industry Citizenship coalition (EICC) based in the USA.  
As we mentioned early, we collected collaborations data from company websites, 
annual reports and conflict mineral reports submitted to SEC. In these sources, companies 
recognise or mention who their collaborations are in terms of transparency initiatives. For 
example, we collected Sony’s collaboration from its own website.  As Sony mentioned on its 
website:  
“It is also Sony's policy to require its suppliers to source materials from smelters determined 
to be compliant with the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC)/Global e-
Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) Conflict-Free Smelter (CFS) Program protocols, or other 
smelters that have been determined to be conflict-free smelters or determined to be conflict-
                                                          
8 See http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/about/ 
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free under other trusted traceability projects. The smelters identified by our direct suppliers 
were then compared against the conflict-free smelter list prepared by the Conflict-Free 
Smelter Initiative (CFSI) established by the EICC/GeSI, to further enhance the accuracy of 
Sony's findings” (see, http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/csr_report/sourcing/materials/). 
 
CSR Performance  
Previous studies in the corporate social responsibility (CSR) area show that CSR performance 
has an influence on CSR reporting (see for example, Patten, 2002; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; 
Clarkson et al., 2008; and Silvia-Gao, 2012). For that reason we include a performance 
measure in our model. Since environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance 
demonstrate a commitment to CSR and therefore to the elimination of socially unacceptable 
practices like the use of conflict minerals, we use the ESG performance measure from the 
Bloomberg database as a performance measure in our study. The Bloomberg ESG score 
ranges from 0 to 100 and is determined based on a whole range of indicators in each of the 
three areas. In the environmental area (E), this is based on 119 items which include items on 
verification, emissions intensity, resource consumption and supply chain management. In the 
social area (S), this is based on 45 items which include items on accidents and fatalities, 
operational policy and supply chain issues. In the governance area (G), this is based on 96 
items which include items on board structure and independence, board committees and 
shareholder rights. These measures are designed to capture actual performance in each of the 
areas, rather than just policies and intentions.9  
In sensitivity tests we also use other performance measures. 
 
Control Variables 
Prior research in the CSR area have shown that there are many factors that could influence 
the extent and comprehensiveness of CSR disclosures. Seeing that conflict mineral 
disclosures could be classified as a CSR disclosure, we use similar control variables in our 
model. We therefore control for the effects of size, industry, profitability, other financial and 
market measures (i.e., leverage, volatility and Tobin’s Q) and a country measure. All the 
control variables, except for the country measure, is from the Bloomberg database. 
                                                          
9 Bloomberg ESG data captures standardized cross-sector and industry-specific metrics. Although Bloomberg, like KLD, 
uses corporate reports as an input to their ratings, they augment this with other formal and informal sources of information 
including evaluations by the United Nations and media reports (see also Cahan et al, 2016).  
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Company size (SIZE). Large companies have a greater societal impact (Hackston and Milne 
1996; Patten, 2002). Since they are more visible, they face more stakeholder pressure to 
demonstrate their social responsibility (Aerts and Cormier 2009). In line with other studies in 
the literature (De Villiers and Van Staden, 2011; Clarkson et al., 2008), we use the natural 
logarithm of sales as SIZE. We use total sales as our size measure (rather than an asset or 
market value measure) as higher sales will indicate more activity and therefore a higher 
possibility of conflict mineral interactions. Since our sample is drawn from the biggest 
companies in the world, size may not be an influence for this group of companies, however, 
we nevertheless include the size measure as it is so widely used in disclosure studies.  
Industry. We divided the sample into six industries based on the Global Industries 
Classification Standard (GICS) sector name. We have the following industries in the sample: 
Information Technology and Telecommunications (N = 59); Industrials (N = 23); Energy (N 
= 17); Health care (N = 15); Consumer Discretionary (N = 16); and Other (N = 9). We 
include a dummy variable for each of these industries in our model. 
Financial performance and position (ROA, LEV, TOBIN Q, and VOLAT). Profitability is 
seen as a determinant for CSR news exposure (see for example Aerts and Cormier (2009); 
Alrazi et al., 2016). Profitable firms are more likely to voluntarily disclose social and 
environmental information to manage their image as socially responsive. We measure 
profitability by return on assets (ROA), calculated as the ratio of net income before 
extraordinary items to total assets (see Clarkson et al., 2008, De Villiers and Van Staden 
2011). 
Since social environmental issues can affect the financial stability of an organisation, 
Roberts (1992) asserts that highly leveraged firms will face greater expectations from 
creditors to observe their social responsibility activities, including initiative to deal with 
conflict minerals. Therefore, they would be expected to provide more extensive disclosure. 
LEV, our measure of leverage, is calculated as average total assets divided by average total 
common equity, i.e., financial leverage.  
Tobin’s Q (TOBIN Q) could represent the level of intangible assets in a firm as well 
as the long-term value of the firm (Cahan et al., 2016). While companies with a higher 
composition of intangible assets in relation to physical assets could be less polluting (see for 
example, Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004, Clarkson et al., 2008, De Villiers and Van Staden, 2011) 
these companies could still face social issues like the use of conflict minerals. While some 
studies suggest that companies with a lower Tobin’s Q would be disclosing more 
environmental information than firms with a higher Tobin’s Q (see for example, Clarkson et 
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al., 2008, De Villiers and Van Staden, 2011) it is not clear what the relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and social disclosures would be. We nevertheless include it following its inclusion 
in the environmental studies in the literature. TOBIN Q is measured as the market value of 
the shares plus the value of preference shares, long term debt and current liabilities, divided 
by total assets.  
We also assess the financial position of a firm based on its stock price volatility 
(VOLAT). Erratic stock price movements could indicate financial instability and engaging in 
socially and environmental irresponsible behaviour would further add to the riskiness as an 
investment. In this sense, there would be a greater pressure for the ‘volatile’ firms to 
demonstrate social environmental responsibility. VOLAT is measured as the standard 
deviation of market adjusted monthly stock returns during the year (based on one year of 
trading). 
Country. Since only companies filed on a US exchange will file a conflict mineral report 
with the SEC, all companies in the sample are listed in the US. However, not all the 
companies are US companies. The country variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a 
company is a US company (95) or a non-US company (44). 
 
Model 
We have use the following model to test for associations between the conflict mineral 
disclosures and our variables of interest using OLS multiple regression analysis.  Our model 
is stated as: 
Disclosure = a1 + B1NGOCollab + B2CSRPerf + B3SIZE+ B4Industry + B5ROA + B6LEV+ 
B7TOBIN Q + B8VOLAT + B9Country 
 
7. Results 
7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The maximum possible disclosure scores a company may have is 20. However, as shown 
in Table 2, the maximum score obtained was 12. Only four companies have scored 12. The 
majority of the companies have scored between 4 and 9 (mean 5.35). The last column of 
Table 2 shows the average disclosure score for each of the nine specific issues, being the 
mean score of each item divided by the maximum possible score for that item (see also Table 
1). Management commitment and Due diligence issues received the highest scores.  
<< Insert Table 2 >> 
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Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for all the variables.  
<< Insert Table 3 >> 
The mean collaboration with social movement organizations (NGOCollab) is 0.61 (min 0, 
max 3). Many companies in the sample have no collaboration with social movements to 
eliminate conflict minerals.10 We therefore test for both the existence and the extent of 
collaboration in our statistical analysis. The mean for performance in the CSR area (CSRPerf) 
is 35.990 (min 5.373, max 83.058). The average sales for companies in the sample (SIZE) is 
$35,5billion (min $600million, max $451billion). Average return on investment (ROA) is 
8.08%, average leverage (LEV) is 3.06 and average Tobin’ Q (TOBIN Q) 1.89 with an 
average volatility (VOLAT) of 25.24. 
 
7.2 Correlations 
Table 4 provides correlation measures. Parametric correlations (Pearson product-moment 
correlations) above the diagonal and the Spearman’s rho correlations below the diagonal. A 
review of the correlation statistics indicates that, as expected, at the univariate level, 
collaboration is significantly associated (at the 1% level) with transparency disclosure scores. 
Table 4 also indicates that some of the control variables are significantly associated with the 
disclosures, which is a good reason for doing multivariate analysis.  The correlation table 
does not reveal any multi-collinearity issues – the highest correlation being 0.695 between 
ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
<< Insert Table 4 >> 
7.3 Mean analysis 
We also did a number of means tests which gave some interesting results. Firstly we 
compared the means of those companies that had NGO collaboration with those who did not 
and find that the mean disclosure score of those that collaborated is significantly higher (p = 
0.000) than those who did not collaborate. Furthermore, there is no significance in the mean 
CSR performance measure between those that collaborated and those who did not. Next we 
split the sample on the basis of those who had above average disclosure scores versus the 
rest. For those with above average disclosure scores we found that the mean collaboration 
level is significantly higher (p = 0.001) and mean sales is significantly higher (p = 0.081), 
                                                          
10 41.79% of the companies in the sample had collaboration (58.21% had no collaboration). 
25 
 
while there is no significant difference in the mean CSR performance between these two 
groups.  
Finally we split the sample between US and non-US companies. We found that US 
companies have on average significantly lower sales than the non-US companies and has 
significantly lower average CSR performance (p = 0.001). However, there is no difference 
between the disclosure scores and collaboration levels of US and non-US companies. 
 
7.4 Regression analysis 
We test the model using an OLS multiple regression model. The dependant variable is the 
comprehensiveness of conflict mineral disclosure. The independent variables are NGO 
collaboration and CSR performance. We use two measures for NGO collaboration, the extent 
of NGO collaboration (Panel A) and the existence of f NGO collaboration (Panel B). The 
results are reported in Table 5. We find that collaboration is significant at the 1% level for 
both the extent and existence of collaboration. This shows that collaboration with NGOs has 
a positive and significant influence on conflict mineral disclosure even after controlling for 
other factors know to influence the quality of disclosure. This supports H1. While both the 
existence and extent of collaboration is significant at the 1% level, our results show that the 
existence of collaboration has a bigger impact (almost double the impact) on the 
comprehensiveness of the disclosure than the extent of the collaboration. So having 
collaboration is more important than having many collaborations. 
CSR performance is also positive and significant at the 1% level. This supports H2 
and suggests that companies with better CSR performance also has more comprehensive 
reporting. 
 Of the control variables we see that volatility and the country variable is positively 
and significantly related to disclosure while leverage and some of the industry variables are 
significantly negatively related to disclosure. In terms of the country variable, this suggest 
that US companies have better conflict mineral disclosures. This is interesting as the mean 
analysis did not show that there was a significant difference between US and non-US 
companies. Furthermore companies with more share price volatility has higher disclosures 
while companies in the Information technology and telecom industry has significantly better 
disclosures than companies in the Energy, Consumer discretion and other industries.  
<< Insert Table 5 >> 
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 When testing hypothesis three we used ESG for the next year as the dependent 
variable and all the other variables, including disclosure, as the independent and control 
variables. We don’t find any significance between collaboration and future ESG 
performance, for both the existence and extent of collaboration. Factors that are significantly 
related to future ESG performance is size and disclosure, both at the 1% level. We therefore 
find no support for H3. This could be because the next year is too soon to see an effect on 
CSR performance. Unfortunately CSR performance for further periods were not available yet 
and we could only test for the effect on the next year. 
 
7.5 Further analysis 
Using different size measures 
Since different size measures are highly correlated with each other, we could not use more 
than one of these in the same model. In our main model we use sales as the size measure. We 
also ran the model using total assets and market value as size measures. Again, following the 
literature in the area, we use the natural log of these measures as they are not normally 
distributed. The results are qualitatively the same as the main results in that the independent 
variables (NGOCollab and CSRPerf) remain significant (but now at the 5% level) and the 
size measures (LnAssets and LnMarket value) was not significant. This shows that our model 
is robust to different measures of size and the fact that size is not significant could be 
attributed to the composition of the sample (the Fortune Global 2000 are the biggest 
companies in the world). 
 
Using different measures for CSR performance 
In our main analysis we used the ESG measure from the Bloomberg database as our CSR 
performance measure. In our sensitivity analysis we used a lead (ESG2014) and lag 
(ESG2012) measure. Again the results remain qualitatively the same with the independent 
variables (NGOCollab and CSRPerf) remaining significant at the 1% level, although using 
ESG2012 drops the significance of the NGOCollab measure to the 5% level. 
 Next we construct another CSR performance measure from the Bloomberg data. We 
use a combination of four measures: Social Supply Chain Management (SSCM); 
Sustainability Supply Guidelines (SSG); Anti-bribery Ethics Policy (AEP); and Business 
Ethics Policy (BEP). Since all four these items were measured as 1 or 0 by Bloomberg, we 
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calculate an average over the four measures as our Combined Ethics Score (CES). Replacing 
the ESG variable with our CES variable results in qualitatively similar results in that the 
independent variables (NGOCollab and CSRPerf) remain significant, but now at the 5% 
level, but for the first time the size measure becomes significant at the 5% level. 
We then develop a CSR measure based on global social movement organizations such 
as Free2work – the organisation that campaign for workers’ rights across different industries 
in different zones including conflict mineral zones. In relation to the electronic industry, it 
developed transparency and workers’ rights related performance scores. The development of 
performance scores was funded by The United Sates Department of State and advised by 
International Labor Rights Forum. Free2Work scores in particular are a measure of a 
company’s efforts to make sure that human rights violations do not exist in its supply chain. 
They are based on publicly available information and data self-reported by companies.11  
Such performance scores can be a proxy for performance in relation to the elimination of 
conflict minerals because the fundamental concern of conflict minerals is the use of forced 
labour and human trafficking in the conflict area.  
Free2Work uses a set of 61 questions about labour policies and practices through its 
“Evaluation Tool.”  Each question falls into one of four categories: Policies, Transparency & 
Traceability, Monitoring & Training, or Worker Rights. Free2Work grades each company 
according to its response to the performance specific to its supply chain.  If a company is 
operating in an industry and regions where there is a high prevalence of human rights 
violations, it will be graded more strictly than one operating only in lower risk situations.  
This means that in order to receive an A grade, a company will need to prove that it has 
significant mechanisms in place to protect workers from abuse. In their evaluation, 
companies with A+, A, A-, B+, B, B- C+, C, C-, appears to show more efforts to ensure that 
human trafficking and forced labor do not exist in its supply chain than companies with 
D+,D, D- and not graded.  Therefore, we assigned a 1 if a company shows effort and 0 if 
company shows minimum or no effort. 
 When we use the measure developed from Free2 Work’s ratings, our results stay 
qualitatively the same with NGOCollab being significant at the 1% level and CSRPerf being 
significant at the 5% level. 
                                                          
11 See http://www.free2work.org/. 
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 Finally we also replaced the ESG variables with the components E (Environmental 
score), S (Social score) and G (Governance score) respectively and again find qualitatively 
similar results to the main analysis. 
 The different CSR performance measures that we used in robustness tests, show that 
our model is robust to different measures of CSR performance. 
 
8. Discussion and Conclusion  
The elimination of conflict minerals from the supply chains of US companies is a major social 
justice issue. The power of NGOs resulting in supply chain transparency disclosures in 
accordance with the Dodd-Frank act can potentially play an important role to minimize the use 
of conflict minerals and ensures global justice. The power of NGOs was not limited to the 
influence of the law (Dodd-Frank act) it was furthermore to influence companies’ level of 
disclosures through their monitoring and collaborations. Using a disclosure index derived from 
requirements of Dodd-Frank act and the OECD guidelines for conflict mineral supply chains, 
we investigate the roles of NGOs with respect to conflict mineral transparency disclosures by 
139 of the largest multinational electronics reliant companies. We find that collaboration with 
NGOs, as social movement organizations, lead to more comprehensive and therefore 
transparent disclosures. The legitimation strategy appears to be the central notion to explain 
such management motivation. Such findings suggest merely relying on regulation does not 
seem to be the answer to create corporate transparency in relation to conflict minerals in 
corporate supply chains. The NGOs’ collaboration is emphasized in such transparency 
processes.   
This study uses a combination of social movement theory, legitimacy theory and the 
theory of collaboration to understand particular disclosure practices. Social movement theory 
is a widely used theory in sociology and organizational studies. Although organizational 
sociologists have become more interested recently in social movement theory as a way of 
thinking about causes of organizational change (King and Soule, 2007), no known research has 
addressed how NGOs as organizational outsiders effect disclosure practices. Like many other 
stakeholders (for instance, news media within Islam and Deegan, 2010), NGOs lack access to 
the conventional avenues of corporate decision making but they may have gained influence in 
the realms of society. One contribution of this paper to the literature is an examination of the 
power of an alternative mechanism to influence companies’ transparency. While social 
movement theory explains the notion that NGOs can influence organizational practices, 
legitimacy theory posits that organizations respond and conform to the influence of social 
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movement NGO collaboration, and that in turn represent or shape the broader community 
expectations.  
This study contributes to the legitimacy literature by investigating the role of NGOs 
over corporate disclosure practices. Prior research, considered the roles of different 
stakeholders (see for example, Deegan, 2002), but does not explain whether and how a 
company conforms to the expectations of the broader community which are driven by NGOs 
via collaboration with the companies or via their independent actions.  A discussion of 
disclosure practices, as a part of the response to NGOs is missing in the accounting research.  
Therefore, another contribution of this study to the literature is its examination of legitimation 
strategy via transparent disclosure practices.  
The findings of this paper make it clear that collaborations with NGOs as outsiders can 
have real influence in the corporate transparency sphere.  Their role as outsiders compared to 
other outsiders such as media and IGOs, gives them a unique place. Unlike others, NGOs, 
through their protests/campaigns and collaborations, act as extra-institutional actors, with the 
goal of changing corporate practices. Within the accounting literature, we see how extra-
institutional actors such as media influence corporate disclosures. So research in understanding 
the role of NGOs is emphasized.  
Our findings also have implications for those who study corporate accountability 
practices within supply chains.  There is little research focusing on accountability issues within 
supply chain management. As NGOs play an active role in the construction of changing 
corporate responsibilities, there is a possibility that companies translate such stakeholder 
concerns into their core accountability and disclosure practices. One of the main implications, 
of our finding that collaboration affect the transparency of disclosure practices, is that 
companies may gain tactical value by paying attention to societal actors/stakeholders who may 
not have direct investment in the companies. That is, if companies do not incorporate NGO’s 
as partners in changing their transparency and accountability, they run the risk of giving them 
reasons to express their grievances publicly, at which point the companies lose control of the 
issue to the public and loses legitimacy.  We show the link between NGOs and corporate supply 
chain transparency disclosures, but obviously the implications are broader in terms of 
companies’ image, reputation and legitimacy.  
Given the disclosure regulations in place (Dodd-Frank Act), it is obvious that 
companies would disclose information in order to comply with the regulation. But the 
implications of this paper is that while the regulation influence disclosures (minimum 
disclosures), the variations of extent and comprehensiveness of disclosures that we have found 
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in this study cannot simply be explained by regulation. We find that it is the collaboration with 
NGOs that lead to the variations of disclosures, but clearly the implications are broader.  In 
particular we are still uncertain about what part of conflict mineral disclosure information 
matters to investors given the US SEC’s mission “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, 
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation” (Taylor, 2014). Given the SEC’s 
mission, the conflict mineral disclosure provision imposed by the SEC is a significant shift in 
the SEC's traditional role as a market regulator of financially material information or financial 
reporting that bears directly on a company's stock performance (Nelson, 2014). So the role of 
NGOs, including public support, creates a new environment where regulators and companies 
(the SEC rules eventually will affect at least six thousand issuers, which is about half of all 
publicly traded companies in the United States) respond.  Our study has implications because 
the conflict minerals rule (section 1502) and the influence of NGOs revisit the question of 
“materiality to market players such as shareholders” in that NGOs influence the level of 
disclosures regardless of materiality in the eyes of shareholders. The rise of the NGOs has 
shifted the paradigm away from accounting and financial information, demanding more 
transparency on issues of human rights and social responsibility. 
This study possesses some limitations. Out of more than 1300 companies that submitted 
conflict mineral reports to SEC, we looked at only 139 reports and all are within electronics 
reliant industries.  As we only look at companies within electronics reliant industries, the 
degree to which our findings can be generalized to other industries cannot be assessed. Our 
disclosure index developed from the SEC rules and OECD guidelines using a weighted scheme, 
like other studies, possess a level of subjectivity. Future research might expand on the findings 
of this paper in some ways. Qualitative and case studies are needed to flesh out the theory of 
social movement explaining their roles and strategies to affect companies’ process of 
transparency rather than output of transparency disclosures. Furthermore, whether NGOs 
continue to protest against irresponsible supply chain practices by companies based in the USA 
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Table 1: Conflict mineral disclosure index  
 Themes  Scale  CS Application of scale 
A Management commitment 
to reduce the use of conflict 
minerals  
0-2 2 No disclosure of commitment or plan, 0 
Briefly mentioned (just produced a statement of commitment), 1 
Detailed coverage of commitment including future goals and 
strategies, 2 
B Determine if the conflict 
minerals originate in the 
DRC or its neighbouring 
countries 
0-2 4 If source or origin of  minerals is  ‘undeterminable’, 0 
If source or origin of minerals is ‘party determinable’ and ‘party 
undeterminable’, 1 
If all sources are completely determinable, 2. 
C Exercise due diligence based 
on an approved framework 
(such as the OECD Due 
Diligence Guidance) to 
determine the origin of the 
minerals  
0-2 6 If no due diligence framework is reported, 0 
If there is reference to a due diligence framework (for example, the 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance, see 
www.OECD.daf/investment/mining)  (minimal description), 1 
If it provides details process and checklist/benchmark against best 
practice guidance such as the OECD due diligence guidance, 2 
D Evidence/examples of 
communications with 
suppliers regarding due 
diligence expectations   
0-2 8 No example, 0 
One example, 1 
More than one examples, 2 
E Evidence of any risk 
management and associated  
performance including a 
description of the time 
frame for improvement  
0-2 10 No discussion  of risk management, 0 
Reference to risk management and associated strategy, 1 
Details of how risk has been (is) managed and related improvement, 
2 
F Amount of money (cost 
information) spent in an 
attempt to eliminate the use 
of conflict minerals 
0-3 13 No disclosure of cost associated with the use and/or elimination of 
conflict minerals, 0 
Disclosure of current aggregate amount spent to reduce the use of 
conflict minerals, 1 
Disclosure of details of current period expenditure by segments, 
country, or major suppliers, 2 
Disclosure of expenditure detail of past and present with estimated 
cost for the future period through comparative statements, 3 
G Number of suppliers with 
conflict minerals and 
reduction of these. 
0-3 16 No disclosure of number of suppliers with conflict minerals,  0 
Reference total  number of suppliers with conflict minerals, 1 
Details of improvement of reduction in number of suppliers with 
conflict minerals compared to previous year, 2 
Year-wise comparative data in the reduction of suppliers with 
conflict minerals with future targets, 3 
H Evidence of regular 
monitoring of supply chains 
to minimise source of 
conflict minerals  
0-2 18 No mention of monitoring of supply chains, 0 
Statement of regular monitoring without improvement (of 
performance) data, 1  
Details of regular monitoring with improvement data and statistics, 
2 
I Exercising conflict mineral 
audits and associated 
reporting  
0-2 20 If there is no audit, 0 
If the conflict mineral report is audited only by an internal auditor, 1 
If the conflict mineral report is audited by a third party, 2 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the elements of the disclosures on conflict minerals 
   







A Management commitment to reduce to 
source of conflict minerals  
0.00 2.00 1.121 0.638 2.00 56.03% 
B Determine if the conflict minerals originate 
in the DRC or its neighbouring countries 
0.00 2.00 0.220 0.433 2.00 11.00% 
C Exercise due diligence based on an approved 
framework (such as OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance) to determine the origin of the 
minerals  
0.00 2.00 1.050 0.613 2.00 52.48% 
D Evidences/examples of communications with 
suppliers regarding due diligence expectations   
0.00 2.00 0.248 0.450 2.00 12.41% 
E Evidence of any risk management and 
associated  performance including a 
description of the time frame for 
improvement  
0.00 2.00 0.872 0.429 2.00 43.62% 
F Amount of money (cost information) spent in 
an attempt to eliminate source of conflict 
minerals 
0.00 1.00 0.028 0.167 3.00  1.00% 
H Number of suppliers  with conflict minerals 0.00 2.00 0.376 0.661 3.00 12.53% 
H Evidence of regular monitoring of supply 
chains to minimise source of conflict minerals  
0.00 2.00 0.872 0.461 2.00 43.62% 
I Exercising  conflict mineral audits and 
associated reporting  
0.00 2.00 0.582 0.888 2.00 29.08% 
 Total disclosure scores 0.00 12.00 5.350 2.952 20.00 26.75% 
 
Note: This table shows the actual scores allocated to each category and in total. The last column show a percentage score 






Table 3: Descriptive statistics  
Variable N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std dev 
Disclosure 139 0.286 0.250 0.050 0.600 0.123 
NGOCollab 139 0.610 0.000 0.000 3.000 0.838 
CSRPerf 133 35.990 35.950 5.372 83.058 17.142 
SIZE 139 37,518,202 13,090,300 600,386 451,235,000 71,512,147 
ROA 139 8.082 6.823 -9.341 67.307 8.507 
LEV 139 3.058 2.138 1.131 47.125 4.286 
TOBIN Q 139 1.894 1.690 0.852 6.348 0.902 
VOLAT 134 25.244 24.044 13.781 56.079 8.340 
 
Notes: Disclosure is the disclosure score being a percentage calculated using the actual score over the potential total score. 
NGOCollab is the extent of collaboration with NGOs. CSRPerf is the CSR performance using the ESG measure from 
Bloomberg. SIZE is total sales. ROA is return on assets. LEV is financial leverage. TOBIN Q is Tobin’s Q. VOLAT is share 
price volatility. Missing data caused N for CSRPerf and VOLAT to be less than 139, leading to a total valid number of 





Table 4: Correlations 
 Disclosure NGOCollab CSRPerf SIZE ROA LEV TOBIN Q VOLAT 
Disclosure - 0.334** 0.168 -0.022 0.017 -0.067 0.051 0.197* 
NGOCollab 0.362** - 0.023 0.049 -0.096 -0.210* 0.007 0.162 
CSRPerf 0.139 0.024 - 0.554** -0.291** 0.071 -0.305** -0.018 
SIZE -0.016 0.019 0.578** - -0.323** 0.129 -0.354** -0.151 
ROA 0.001 -0.100 -0.238** -0.278** - -0.103 0.395** -0.200* 
LEV -0.089 0.004 0.129 0.273** -0.435** - -0.075 0.054 
TOBIN Q 0.088 -0.005 -0.310** -0.372** 0.695** -0.271** - -0.220* 
VOLAT 0.187* 0.192* -0.102 -0.203* -0.269** 0.040 -0.271** - 
Info Tech 0.315** 0.343** 0.035 -0.128 0.046 -0.231** -0.014 0.298** 
Industrials 0.026 -0.055 0.023 0.145 -0.004 0.220** 0.086 -0.329** 
Energy -0.262** -0.261** 0.080 -0.179* 0.010 -0.093 -0.147 -0.091 
Healthcare -0.093 -0.214* -0.119 -0.209* 0.089 -0.092 0.187* -0.206* 
Cons Discr -0.042 0.121 -0.153 0.074 -0.054 0.166 -0.065 0.259** 
Other -0.158 -0.147 0.153 -0.026 -0.151 0.167* -0.069 -0.038 











Table 4 - continued 
 Info Tech Industrials Energy Healthcare Cons Discr Other Country 
Disclosure 0.304** 0.058 -0.254** -0.107 -0.052 -0.161 0.101 
NGOCollab 0.312** -0.048 -0.247** -0.210* 0.141 -0.144 -0.094 
CSRPerf 0.037 0.013 0.096 -0.127 -0.146 0.144 -0.288** 
SIZE -0.164 0.125 0.220** -0.201* 0.105 -0.030 -0.200* 
ROA 0.127 -0.057 -0.041 0.012 0.002 -0.138 0.081 
LEV 0.041 0.046 -0.070 -0.081 0.041 -0.007 -0.091 
TOBIN Q -0.024 -0.008 -0.146 0.094 0.094 0.013 0.246** 
VOLAT 0.239** -0.280** -0.102 -0.180* 0.256** -0.010 -0.167 
Info Tech - -0.382** -0.321** -0.310** -0.310** -0.212* -0.104 
Industrials -0.382** - -0.166 -0.161 -0.161 -0.110 0.053 
Energy -0.321** -0.166 - -0.135 -0.135 -0.092 0.065 
Healthcare -0.310** -0.161 -0.135 - -0.130 -0.089 0.149 
Cons Discr -0.310** -0.161 -0.135 -0.130 - -0.089 -0.094 
Other -0.212* -0.110 -0.092 -0.089 -0.089 - -0.031 
Country -0.104 0.053 0.065 0.149 -0.094 -0.031 - 
 
Notes: Info Tech is the Information Technology and Telecommunication industry. Industrials is the Industrials industry. 
Healthcare is the Healthcare industry. Cons Discr is the consumer discretion industry. Other is all remaining industries and 
includes the Consumers staples, Materials and Utilities industries. All industry classifications are based on the GICS 
classifications. Country is a country variable showing whether a company is a US company or not. All other variables are 
explained in Table 3. 








 Panel A:  
Extent of Collaboration 
Panel B:  
Existence of Collaboration 
 
 
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Constant 7.095 0.580 9.645 0.448 
NGOCollab (+) 3.495 0.009*** 6.854 0.003*** 
CSRPerf (+) 0.208 0.006*** 0.211 0.005*** 
SIZE 0.035 0.974 -0.150 0.891 
ROA 0.114 0.456 0.099 0.509 
LEV -0.386 0.088* -0.339 0.125 
TOBIN Q 1.008 0.457 0.810 0.547 
VOLAT 0.344 0.017** 0.295 0.040** 
Industrials 1.017 0.737 1.079 0.718 
Energy -9.400 0.007*** -8.745 0.011** 
Healthcare -3.539 0.305 -3.269 0.337 
Cons Discr -6.406 0.077* -5.308 0.141 
Other -9.381 0.048** -9.143 0.051* 
Country 5.557 0.017** 5.315 0.021** 
N 129  129  
Model F stat 3.875 0.000*** 4.130 0.000*** 
Adj. R2 0.226   0.241 
 
Notes: All variables have been defined in Tables 3 and 4. The Telecommunications and Telecom industry has been excluded 
in the multivariate analysis. 
*, ** and *** represent significance levels at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively, all one-tailed, except for the 
constant. 
